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Abstract
We consider the problem of amplifying two-party coin-tossing protocols: given a protocol where it
is possible to bias the common output by at most ρ, we aim to obtain a new protocol where the
output can be biased by at most ρ? < ρ. We rule out the existence of a natural type of amplifiers
called oblivious amplifiers for every ρ? < ρ. Such amplifiers ignore the way that the underlying
ρ-bias protocol works and can only invoke an oracle that provides ρ-bias bits.
We provide two proofs of this impossibility. The first is by a reduction to the impossibility of
deterministic randomness extraction from Santha-Vazirani sources. The second is a direct proof
that is more general and also rules outs certain types of asymmetric amplification. In addition, it
gives yet another proof for the Santha-Vazirani impossibility.
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1 Introduction
Hardness amplification is a foundational problem in cryptography: given a cryptographic
primitive that is weakly secure in some sense, we would like to make it strongly secure. Two
famous examples of such amplification procedures are Yao’s amplification of weak one-way
functions into strong ones and Yao’s Xor lemma for amplifying unpredictability [17]. Other
examples of primitives with known amplification procedures include public-key encryption
[5, 11], oblivious transfer [4, 16], commitments [4, 8] and cryptographic arguments [6].
Coin-Tossing Protocols
We consider amplification of coin-tossing protocols [3]. Such protocols allow two parties to
jointly toss an unbiased coin, such that even if one party is malicious and diverges from the
protocol, it cannot significantly bias the outcome. Concretely, a ρ-bias coin-tossing protocol
is such that a cheating party cannot force the common outcome to be any specific bit b with
probability greater than 1/2 + ρ.
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It is common knowledge that coin-tossing protocols against unbounded (or even PSPACE)
adversaries cannot have bias ρ < 1/2. Accordingly, the common definition addresses efficient
adversaries. Here coin-tossing protocols with negligible bias have been long known assuming
one-way functions [3, 9, 13]. In fact, a long line of work shows that one-way functions are,
in fact, necessary provided that the bias is at most ρ < 1/2− Ω(1) [10, 12, 7, 2]. Whether
one-way functions are necessary for any non-trivial bias ρ < 1/2 − 1/poly(n) (or even for
some ρ = 1/2− o(1)) remains an open problem.
Amplifying Coin Tossing
A coin-tossing amplifier should take a coin-tossing protocol pi with (non-trivial) bias ρ < 1/2
and transform it into a new coin-tossing protocol pi? with smaller bias ρ? < ρ. One specific
way for obtaining coin-tossing amplifiers is to first derive from the protocol pi a one-way
function fpi, and then construct optimal coin tossing from fpi. Indeed, following the known
results mentioned above this would work for any
negl(n) < ρ? < ρ < 1/2− Ω(1) .
In this work, we ask whether there exist “more direct” amplification procedures, which
we call oblivious amplifiers. Such amplifiers completely ignore the way that the underlying
protocol pi works, they only obtain oracle access to the result – the adversary can adaptively
bias the resulting bit of each oracle invocation as long as the bias is bounded by ρ. The
amplifier is required to satisfy an information theoretic guarantee: unbounded attackers
cannot bias the common output of the new protocol pi∗ by more than ρ∗ < ρ. Addressing
unbounded attackers is a natural choice as we wish to avoid computational assumptions
(certainly, one-way functions, which would trivialize the problem).
We find the model of oblivious amplifiers quite natural and similar to other settings, such
as Yao’s Xor lemma [17], where amplifiers satisfy an information theoretic guarantee. In
particular, constructing such amplifiers seems like a natural route toward fully understanding
the complexity of coin tossing. In particular, the existence of such efficient amplifiers for
ρ? ≤ 1/2− Ω(1) < 1/2− 1/poly(n) ≤ ρ
would completely resolve the question, showing that any non-trivial coin tossing is equivalent
to one-way functions.
1.1 Results
We show that oblivious coin-tossing amplifiers do not exist.
I Theorem 1 (Informal). There do not exist oblivious coin-tossing amplifiers for any ρ∗ < ρ.
Our theorem can further be extended to rule out oblivious amplification of weak coin
tossing [2] that essentially requires that one side cannot bias toward 0 and the other cannot
bias toward 1. (See Remark 6.)
A More General Lower Bound
We give two proofs of the above theorem. The first is by a simple reduction to the impossibility
of deterministic randomness extraction from Santha-Vazirani sources [15]. We also give a
direct proof that provides a more general lower bound. In particular, we quantify the tradeoff
between improving the potential bias caused by specific party A toward a specific bit b, at
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the account of making it worst for other party B and bit 1− b. This also rules out oblivious
amplification for asymmetric notions of coin tossing where we allow different bounds on
the bias for the two parties. The tradeoff is explained in the technical overview below and
expressed in Figure 2.
The alternative proof also gives yet another proof of the Santha-Vazirani impossibility
for deterministic extraction (in addition to several existing proofs [15, 14, 1]).
1.2 Technical Overview
We now give a brief overview of our proofs.
Modeling Protocols as Trees
We model any possible amplifier protocol pi? as a full binary tree. The correspondence is
natural: the root corresponds to the beginning of the protocol before any message is sent.
Every inner node in the tree is either
Controlled by one of the two parties A or B, meaning that it is this party’s turn to send
a message, without loss of generality, a single bit.
Representing an oracle call to the underlying protocol pi resulting in a common bit.
Whenever a message is sent or an oracle call is made, we move in accordance to the left or
right child, until reaching a leaf labeled by the common outcome of the protocol. Here the
execution ends.
Each node is associated with some (honest) distribution on the next bit to be sent or
produced by the oracle. The adversary can gain control over the nodes representing one
of the parties and arbitrarily fix their distributions. For any oracle node, the adversary
can fix an arbitrary distribution provided that it has bias at most ρ. Note that every node
corresponds to some partial execution of the protocol, represented by the path from the root
to this node, and the adversarial response is adaptively fixed according to this path. (See
illustration in Figure 1.)
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1
Figure 1 An example of a protocol represented by a tree. Each node specifies which party should
send a bit as well as the distribution of this bit (when the party is honest). Alternatively, the parties
may invoke the oracle and obtain a joint bit. The adversary may take control of one of the parties
and arbitrarily replace its distributions; it can also replace the oracle call distributions provided that
they remain ρ-biased.
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The above model does not explicitly capture protocols where honest parties may store
private coins through the interaction. However, we can transform any private-coin protocol
to a protocol in the above model by considering parties that do not explicitly keep private
randomness; instead, in every node they resample their private randomness conditioned on
the execution transcript so far and answer according to that string. The transformation has
no effect on the distribution of transcript and in particular on the outcome bit. However,
the transformation may make the new protocol inefficient. This is not an issue as our lower
bound will in fact hold for inefficient protocols as well.
A Reduction to Deterministic Santha-Vazirani Extractors
In their seminal work, Santha and Vazirani considered the problem of extracting a statistically
uniform bit from a sequence of biased random bits X = X1, . . . , Xn such that Xi has bounded
bias ρ conditioned on any fixing of X1, . . . , Xi−1. Such random sources X are called Santha-
Vazirani Sources. They proved that there exist no deterministic extractors for such sources,
namely, for any deterministic Boolean function E, there exists a Santha-Vazirani source such
that E(X) is far from uniform. In fact, they proved that E(X) is ρ-biased.
Indeed, this bares similarity to the setting of oblivious coin-tossing amplification where
the ρ-biased input bits naturally correspond to oracle calls to pi. The gap between the
two models is that a coin-tossing oblivious amplifier further allows interaction between two
randomized parties. To bridge this gap, we prove that any oblivious amplifier can be turned
into a non-interactive oblivious amplifier.
To convey the basic idea, imagine that we have an amplifier tree where the root belongs
to party A (namely, it sends the first message). We argue that at least one of its left or
right subtrees also has bias at most ρ?, and thus we can reduce one round of interaction. In
fact, both subtrees must be such that an adversary controlling A can bias the outcome by at
most ρ?, or else an adversary controlling A in the original protocol could have simply always
chosen the worse subtree in order to bias the outcome by more than ρ?. We then observe
that at least one of the subtrees must be such that an adversary controlling B cannot bias by
more than ρ?. Indeed, the bias caused by an adversary controlling B in the original protocol
is just a convex combination of the its bias in the two corresponding subtrees.
The Second Proof and a More General Lower Bound
Our second proof of the theorem pours more light on the tradeoff between how much each
party can bias the protocol towards a specific bit. We first give a correspondence between
protocols and points on the plane. For a protocol pi, let xpi be the maximum probability
a malicious A∗ (controlling A) can force output 0 and ypi be the maximum probability a
malicious B∗ can force output 1. We assign the protocol pi coordinates (xpi, ypi). Considering
the tree representing the protocol pi, the point in the plane corresponding to the protocol pi
is determined by the points corresponding to its children themselves as protocols, as well as
the operation at its root. (This is roughly done following a similar argument to the one used
above, where we either take the maximum of two subtrees, or a convex combination thereof.)
Our basic Theorem 1 and its proof show that all points corresponding to protocols lie
outside the axis-aligned square given by x = 0, y = 0, x = 0.5 + ρ, y = 0.5 + ρ. Our more
general analysis, shows a more accurate picture – all points lie above a certain piecewise
linear f (See Figure 2). In a bit more detail, we prove by induction on the depth of the
tree that the point corresponding to every protocol lies above the function f , by showing
closure of points above f to each of the operations that may appear at the root, and also
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that protocol leaves (the base case) lie above f . When considering a non-leaf protocol, we
get from the induction that the sub-protocols rooted at its children lie above f , and since
the set of points above f is closed under the operation at the protocols’ root, the point
corresponding to the protocol itself also lies above f .
This more general result shows that we cannot hope to improve the xpi-value of the oracle
without strictly hurting its ypi-value, and furthermore gives some lower bound g(∆x), for
every 0 ≤ ∆x ≤ xpi, on how much ypi must increase in order to reduce xpi by ∆x.
Figure 2 For the sake of this illustration, we set ρ = 0.2. The X-axis represents the ability of
a malicious A∗ to bias the common output toward 0, and the Y -axis represents the ability of a
malicious B∗ to bias the common output toward 1. While our basic Theorem 1 argues that all
protocols lie outside the dotted square, our more general theorem shows that they in fact lie above
the piece-wise linear function represented by the continuous line.
Organization
In Section 2, we define the relevant notion of oblivious amplifiers and their correspondence to
trees. In Section 3, we prove the main impossibility result by a reduction to the impossibility
of deterministic Santha-Vazirani extraction. In Section 4, we give our alternative (direct)
proof leading to a more general lower bound.
2 Definitions
Throughout the paper, we denote by Ber(p) the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p,
namely, the value 1 gets probability p and 0 gets 1− p.
I Definition 2 (Common-output two-party protocol with oracle access to ρ-biased bits). We
model a common-output two-party protocol with oracle access to ρ-biased bits using full binary
trees such that:
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Every leaf is labeled with either “0” or “1”, which represent the common output of the
protocol upon reaching that leaf.
Every inner node v is labeled with “(Pv, qv)” where
1. Pv ∈ {A,B,O} represents whether it is A’s turn to speak, B’s turn to speak, or an
oracle call.
2. In an honest execution, the bit sent after reaching that node should be distributed
according to Ber(qv). If Pv = O then qv must be 0.5, otherwise qv may be an arbitrary
probability.
Execution. An execution of the protocol follows a path along the tree, starting at the root
and going left/right in accordance to the bits sent, when 0 means left and 1 means right,
until reaching a leaf which determines the common output of that execution.
Adversarial behavior. A malicious party can ignore qv when it is their turn to speak and send
an arbitrarily distributed bit instead. Also, whenever the oracle is called, the malicious
party may change the output distribution of that call from Ber(0.5) to Ber(qv) for any
qv such that |qv − 0.5| ≤ ρ. Note that qv may depend on all the bits sent up to that call
I Definition 3. Given a protocol pi, A∗ an adversarial behavior of A and b ∈ {0, 1}, we denote
by pi(A∗, b) the probability of pi’s output being b when executed with A∗ and an honest B.
Next, define Opt(pi,A∗, b) := max
A∗
pi(A∗, b), where the maximum is taken over all adversarial
behaviors A∗ of A. pi(B∗, b) and Opt(pi,B∗, b) are defined symmetrically for B.
I Definition 4 ((α, β)-oblivious coin-tossing amplifier). A common-output two-party protocol
pi with oracle access to α-biased bits is an (α, β)-oblivious coin-tossing amplifier if
max
P∗,b
Opt(pi, P ∗, b) ≤ 0.5 + β ,
where P ∗ ∈ {A∗, B∗} and b ∈ {0, 1}. In addition, we require that the expected output of pi
over an honest execution is 0.5.
I Remark 5. Actually, for the lower bound, we do not use the fact that the expected output
of pi over an honest execution is 0.5. We note that bounded biases already makes coin-tossing
protocols non-trivial.
I Remark 6. We may also consider the notion of (α, β)-oblivious weak coin-tossing amplifiers,
which aim to produce a β-bias weak coin tossing (CT) protocol instead of standard β-CT. In
the weak CT setting, we know in advance that A∗ aims to bias the result toward 0 while B∗
aims to bias the result toward 1. We only need to bound their ability to bias the output in
their chosen direction. The difference is in the requirement
max
P∗,b
Opt(pi, P ∗, b) ≤ 0.5 + β ,
which is replaced with
max{Opt(pi,A∗, 0), Opt(pi,B∗, 1)} ≤ 0.5 + β .
3 Impossibility of Oblivious Amplifiers
In this section, we state and prove our main result regarding the impossibility of non-trivial
oblivious coin-tossing amplifiers.
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I Theorem 7 (main). For every common-output two-party protocol pi with oracle access to
ρ-biased bits, either Opt(pi,A∗, 0) ≥ 0.5 + ρ or Opt(pi,B∗, 1) ≥ 0.5 + ρ. In particular, there
do not exist (α, β)-oblivious coin-tossing amplifier, for any β < α.
Toward proving the theorem, we first analyze in Section 3.1 the best possible (unbounded)
attacks. Then in Section 3.2, we give the reduction to the impossibility of deterministic
extraction from Santha-Vazirani sources.
3.1 The Optimal Attacks
Let pi be a common-output two-party protocol with oracle access to ρ-biased bits, and denote
its root by r. Also, denote by pi0 and pi1 the protocols rooted at the left and right children of
r. The best strategy of a malicious A∗ to make the protocol pi output 0 is to bias the first
bit b as much as possible towards arg maxz∈{0,1}Opt(piz, A∗, 0), and after b is sent continue
to recursively apply the best strategy at the resulting child. The best strategy of a malicious
B∗ to make the protocol pi output 1 is symmetrical. Thus, we have that:
If r is labeled with “A, p”, then A can completely bias the bit while B cannot change its
distribution at all, so
Opt(pi,A∗, 0) = max
z∈{0,1}
Opt(piz, A∗, 0)
Opt(pi,B∗, 1) = Ez∼Ber(p) [Opt(piz, B∗, 1)]
If r is labeled with “B, p”, then B can completely bias the bit while A cannot change its
distribution at all, so
Opt(pi,A∗, 0) = Ez∼Ber(p) [Opt(piz, A∗, 0)]
Opt(pi,B∗, 1) = max
z∈{0,1}
Opt(piz, B∗, 1)
If r is labeled with “O”, then both A and B can bias the bit by at most ρ, so
Opt(pi,A∗, 0) = (0.5− ρ) · min
z∈{0,1}
Optz(pi,A∗, 0) + (0.5 + ρ) · max
z∈{0,1}
Opt(piz, A∗, 0)
Opt(pi,B∗, 1) = (0.5− ρ) · min
z∈{0,1}
Opt(piz, B∗, 1) + (0.5 + ρ) · max
z∈{0,1}
Opt(piz, B∗, 1)
If r is a leaf labeled with “0”, then
Opt(pi,A∗, 0) = 1
Opt(pi,B∗, 1) = 0
If r is a leaf labeled with “1”, then
Opt(pi,A∗, 0) = 0
Opt(pi,B∗, 1) = 1
3.2 Reduction to Deterministic Santha-Vazirani Extraction
The following theorem states that allowing interaction does not help in creating more secure
protocols, in the sense that it does not allow us to generate a better protocol, in either
Opt(pi,A∗, 0) or Opt(pi,B∗, 1), than protocols already existing without interaction.
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I Theorem 8. For every common-output two-party protocol pi with oracle access to ρ-biased
bits, there exists a common-output two-party protocol pi′ with oracle access to ρ-biased bits, with
no inner nodes labeled by either “A, p” or “B, p”, and such that Opt(pi′, A∗, 0) ≤ Opt(pi,A∗, 0)
and Opt(pi′, B∗, 1) ≤ Opt(pi,B∗, 1)
In other words, allowing interaction does not help in producing protocols where it is
harder for A∗ to cheat towards 0 or for B∗ to cheat towards 1.
Proof. We show how given any protocol pi with “A, p”/“B, p” turns, we can strictly reduce
its number of “A, p”/“B, p” turns without increasing its cheating probabilities Opt(pi,A∗, 0)
and Opt(pi,B∗, 1). In essence, we show that for every inner node labeled with “A, p”/“B, p”
there exists a child such that replacing the subtree rooted at that node with the subtree
rooted at its child results a protocol that is only harder to cheat in, for both A∗ towards
0 and B∗ towards 1. In more detail: First, we pick some arbitrary inner node of pi labeled
with either “A, p” or “B, p”. Denote this node by N , and its left and right children by N0
and N1, respectively. If N is labeled by “A, p” we choose z := arg minb∈{0,1}Opt(Nb, B∗, 1),
otherwise choose z := arg minb∈{0,1}Opt(Nb, A∗, 0). We take pi and replace in it the subtree
rooted at N with the subtree rooted at Nz. Essentially, we fixed the bit sent at node N to
always be z, instead of letting A/B choose it. We make two observations:
1. Both Opt(Nz, A∗, 0) ≤ Opt(N,A∗, 0) and Opt(Nz, B∗, 1) ≤ Opt(N,B∗, 1).
To see this, assume w.l.o.g that N is labeled with “A, p” (symmetrical argument for
“B, p”). We have that Opt(N,A∗, 0) = maxb∈{0,1}Opt(Nb, A∗, 0) and in particular
Opt(N,A∗, 0) ≥ Opt(Nz, A∗, 0). Also, since we have that
Opt(N,B∗, 1) = Eb∼Ber(p) [Opt(Nb, B∗, 1)]
and we chose z := arg minb∈{0,1}Opt(Nb, B∗, 1) in case N is labeled with “A, p”, then
Opt(N,B∗, 1) ≥ Opt(Nz, B∗, 1).
In other words, at Nz it is both harder for A∗ to cheat towards 0 and for B∗ to cheat
towards 1.
2. Let pi and T be protocols, N be some node of pi, and pi′ be the protocol resulted
by replacing in pi the subtree rooted at N with T . If Opt(T,A∗, 0) ≤ Opt(N,A∗, 0)
then Opt(pi′, A∗, 0) ≤ Opt(pi,A∗, 0) and similarly if Opt(T,B∗, 1) ≤ Opt(N,B∗, 1) then
Opt(pi′, B∗, 1) ≤ Opt(pi,B∗, 1). The reason for this is that the value Opt(R,A∗, 0) of an
inner node R, for all three operations (“A, p”,“B, p”,“O”), is a monotone function of the
values Opt(R0, A∗, 0), Opt(R1, A∗, 0) of its children. By not increasing the (A∗, 0)-value
of some node, you cannot increase the (A∗, 0)-value of its father, which in turn will not
increase the (A∗, 0)-value of its father and so on.
In other words, by taking a protocol and replacing the sub-protocol run at some partial
transcript with another sub-protocol where it is not easier for A∗/B∗ to cheat towards
0/1, we result a protocol where it is not easier for A∗/B∗ to cheat towards 0/1.
Combining these observations, we reach the conclusion that by taking a protocol and
repeatedly getting rid of its “A, p”/“B, p” nodes by replacing the subtree rooted at them with
the subtree rooted at a correctly chosen child of theirs, we can get rid of all the “A, p”/“B, p”
turns without increasing the cheating probabilities of A∗ towards 0 and of B∗ towards 1. J
I Definition 9 (SV Source). For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5, a source X = X1, . . . , Xn of length n (A
random variable taking values in {0, 1}n) is a Santha-Vazirani (SV) source with bias ρ
if for every i ∈ [n] and every x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ {0, 1}, the bias of Xi conditioned on X1 =
x1, . . . , Xi−1 = xi−1 is at most ρ. That is,
|E [Xi|X1 = x1, . . . , Xi−1 = xi−1]− 0.5| ≤ ρ .
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I Theorem 10 ([15], [14]). For every function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and every 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5
there exists an SV source X = X1, . . . , Xn of length n and bias ρ such that f(X) has bias at
least ρ.
We remark that this version of the statement is taken from Reingold, Vadhan and
Wigderson [14], and that differently from them we refer to the bias as the distance from 0.5
and not double that amount.
The following theorem implies that there are no non-trivial oblivious coin-tossing amplifiers
comprised solely of oracle calls.
I Theorem 11. For every common-output two-party protocol pi with oracle access to ρ-biased
bits and no inner nodes labeled by either “A, p” or “B, p”, either Opt(pi,A∗, 0) ≥ 0.5 + ρ or
Opt(pi,B∗, 1) ≥ 0.5 + ρ
In fact, in a protocol with no “A, p”/“B, p” turns there is no longer a difference between A and
B so either Opt(pi,A∗, 0) = Opt(pi,B∗, 0) ≥ 0.5+ρ or Opt(pi,A∗, 1) = Opt(pi,B∗, 1) ≥ 0.5+ρ
Proof. Let n be an upper bound on the number of oracle calls made by pi in any execution.
We can think w.l.o.g of pi as always making exactly n oracle calls, with results denoted by
o1, . . . , on, and then outputting f(o1, . . . , on) for some function f . The impossibility result
of deterministic extraction from Santha-Vazirani sources, Theorem 10, guarantees that there
exists an SV source X = X1, . . . , Xn of length n and bias ρ such that f(X) has bias at
least ρ. Therefore, if the malicious party can make sure the oracle calls’ output distribution
is X, they can succeed in biasing the output of pi by at least ρ. (If it is towards 0 then
Opt(pi,A∗, 0) ≥ 0.5 + ρ and if it is towards 1 then Opt(pi,B∗, 1) ≥ 0.5 + ρ). The malicious
party can make sure the oracle calls’ output distribution is X by doing it bit-by-bit: After
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 calls with results x1, . . . , xi they ask the next oracle call to be distributed
according to Xi+1|X1 = x1, . . . , Xi = xi, and their request from the ρ-biased bit oracle is
legal by the definition of SV sources with bias ρ. J
Combining Theorem 8 and Theorem 11, Theorem 7 follows.
4 A More General Lower Bound
In this section, we give a direct proof by induction which gives some insight on the possible
relations between Opt(pi,A∗, 0) and Opt(pi,B∗, 1) and the trade-offs we can get between
them.
We correspond every protocol with a point on the plane using Opt(pi,A∗, 0) as the
x-coordinate and Opt(pi,B∗, 1) as the y-coordinate. Our main theorem translates into
showing that all protocol points lie outside or on the axis-aligned square with boundaries
x = 0.5 + ρ, x = 0 and y = 0.5 + ρ, y = 0, but still inside of the first (i.e., (+,+)) quadrant
(the second part is obvious from the definition). The area outside the square (but still inside
the first quadrant) is not closed under the oracle-call operation (defined later), and thus
the naïve induction attempt fails. Instead, we will strengthen the induction hypothesis into
showing that all points lie above f := min
(
1− 0.5−ρ0.5+ρ · x, 0.5+ρ0.5−ρ − 0.5+ρ0.5−ρ · x
)
, which is both
closed under all operations (now the induction works) and lies above the square (so it implies
what we want, and more). See Figure 2 for a graphic representation of the square and f .
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I Theorem 12. For every common-output two-party protocol pi with oracle access to ρ-biased
bits, we have that Opt(pi,B∗, 1) ≥ min(1− 0.5−ρ0.5+ρ ·Opt(pi,A∗, 0), 0.5+ρ0.5−ρ − 0.5+ρ0.5−ρ ·Opt(pi,A∗, 0))
Equivalently, if we take `1 to be the line between (0, 1) and (0.5 + ρ, 0.5 + ρ)
so `1 is y = 1− 0.5− ρ0.5 + ρ · x
and `2 to be the line between (0.5 + ρ, 0.5 + ρ) and (1, 0)
so `2 is y =
0.5 + ρ
0.5− ρ −
0.5 + ρ
0.5− ρ · x
then the point (Opt(pi,A∗, 0), Opt(pi,B∗, 1)) lies above (not strictly) at least one of `1, `2.
I Corollary 13. Theorem 7 follows.
Proof. Since both `1 and `2 are strictly decreasing (negative slope) and pass through the point
(0.5 + ρ, 0.5 + ρ), then x < 0.5+ρ implies `1(x), `2(x) > 0.5+ρ. Thus Opt(pi,A∗, 0) < 0.5+ρ
implies Opt(pi,B∗, 1) ≥ min (`1(Opt(pi,A∗, 0)), `2(Opt(pi,A∗, 0))) > 0.5 + ρ J
Proof of Theorem 12. Proof by induction on the depth.
Leaves labeled with “0” lie on `2 and leaves labeled with “1” lie on `1.
If pi is not a leaf, denote its root by r, by pi0 and pi1 the protocols rooted at the left and right
children of r, and let f := min(`1, `2). Also, denote
x0, y0 = Opt(pi0, A∗, 0), Opt(pi0, B∗, 1)
x1, y1 = Opt(pi1, A∗, 0), Opt(pi1, B∗, 1)
x′, y′ = Opt(pi,A∗, 0), Opt(pi,B∗, 1)
We assume (induction hypothesis) that y0 ≥ f(x0), y1 ≥ f(x1) and want to show that
y′ ≥ f(x′). There are three types of operations to consider:
If r is labeled with “A, p”(
x′
y′
)
=
(
max(x0, x1)
(1− p) · y0 + p · y1
)
If r is labeled with “B, p”(
x′
y′
)
=
(
(1− p) · x0 + p · x1
max(y0, y1)
)
If r is labeled with “O”(
x′
y′
)
=
(
(0.5− ρ) ·min(x0, x1) + (0.5 + ρ) ·max(x0, x1)
(0.5− ρ) ·min(y0, y1) + (0.5 + ρ) ·max(y0, y1)
)
We may assume without loss of generality that the points (x0, y0), (x1, y1) lie on f and
not strictly above it, namely, that y0 = f(x0), y1 = f(x1). This is true because y′ is
non-decreasing in y0, y1 in all three operations, so if y′ ≥ f(x′) for y0 = f(x0), y1 = f(x1),
then we also have that y′ ≥ f(x′) for any y0 ≥ f(x0), y1 ≥ f(x1).
(Note that f(x′) is unaffected by changes to y0, y1)
Let (x0, y0), (x1, y1) be any two points on f . Since `1 and `2 are decreasing, f is also
decreasing. Let i = arg maxz∈{0,1} xz, so we have that xi > x1−i and yi < y1−i.
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The first operation gives us (x′, y′) = (xi, (1− p) · y0 + p · y1), and since
y′ = (1− p) · y0 + p · y1 > yi = min
z∈{0,1}
yz
for every 0 < p < 1, we have y′ > yi = f(xi) = f(x′).
The second operation gives us (x′, y′) = ((1− p) · x0 + p · x1, y1−i), and since
x′ = (1− p) · x0 + p · x1 > x1−i = min
z∈{0,1}
xz
for every 0 < p < 1, we have f(x′) < f(x1−i) = y1−i = y′.
The third operation gives us(
x′
y′
)
=
(
(0.5− ρ) · x1−i + (0.5 + ρ) · xi
(0.5− ρ) · yi + (0.5 + ρ) · y1−i
)
We separate into two cases:
1. Both (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) lie on either `1 or `2. Denote this common line by `. Notice
that every convex combination of (x0, y0), (x1, y1) also lies on `, and in particular(
x0.5+ρ
y0.5+ρ
)
= (0.5− ρ) ·
(
x0
y0
)
+ (0.5 + ρ)
(
x1
y1
)
=
(
(0.5− ρ) · x0 + (0.5 + ρ) · x1
(0.5− ρ) · y0 + (0.5 + ρ) · y1
)
lies on `. Since x1−i = min(x0, x1) and xi = max(x0, x1), we have that
x′ = (0.5− ρ) · x1−i + (0.5 + ρ) · xi ≥ (0.5− ρ) · x0 + (0.5 + ρ) · x1 = x0.5+ρ
Since yi = min(y0, y1) and y1−i = max(y0, y1), we have that
y′ = (0.5− ρ) · yi + (0.5 + ρ) · y1−i ≥ (0.5− ρ) · y0 + (0.5 + ρ) · y1 = y0.5+ρ
Overall, we conclude that f(x′) ≤ `(x′) ≤ `(x0.5+ρ) = y0.5+ρ ≤ y′.
2. One of (x0, y0), (x1, y1) lies on `1 and the other lies on `2. The lines `1, `2 intersect at
(0.5 + ρ, 0.5 + ρ) and the slope of `2 is steeper, so we can conclude that
f(x) = min(`1, `2) =
{
`1(x) x ≤ 0.5 + ρ
`2(x) x > 0.5 + ρ
and that x1−i < 0.5 + ρ < xi. We have that
y′ = (0.5− ρ) · yi + (0.5 + ρ) · y1−i = (0.5− ρ) · `2(xi) + (0.5 + ρ) · `1(x1−i) =
= (0.5− ρ) ·
(
0.5 + ρ
0.5− ρ −
0.5 + ρ
0.5− ρ · xi
)
+ (0.5 + ρ) ·
(
1− 0.5− ρ0.5 + ρ · x1−i
)
=
= 0.5 + ρ− (0.5 + ρ) · xi + 0.5 + ρ− (0.5− ρ) · x1−i =
= 1 + 2ρ− ((0.5 + ρ) · xi + (0.5− ρ) · x1−i) = 1 + 2ρ− x′
Therefore, the point (x′, y′) lies on the line y = 1 + 2ρ − x which we will denote
by `. Notice that ` also passes through (0.5 + ρ, 0.5 + ρ), and that the slope of `
is steeper than that of `1 but more moderate than that of `2, and thus `1 ≤ ` for
x ≤ 0.5 + ρ, and `2 ≤ ` for x ≥ 0.5 + ρ, and overall f(x) ≤ `(x). This implies that
f(x′) ≤ `(x′) = y′. J
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